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The present single-case study examined functional brain imaging patterns in a participant
that reported being able, at will, to produce somatosensory sensations that are experienced
as her body moving outside the boundaries of her physical body all the while remaining
aware of her unmoving physical body. We found that the brain functional changes associ-
ated with the reported extra-corporeal experience (ECE) were different than those observed
in motor imagery. Activations were mainly left-sided and involved the left supplementary
motor area and supramarginal and posterior superior temporal gyri, the last two overlapping
with the temporal parietal junction that has been associated with out-of-body experiences.
The cerebellum also showed activation that is consistent with the participant’s report of the
impression of movement during the ECE. There was also left middle and superior orbital
frontal gyri activity, regions often associated with action monitoring. The results suggest
that the ECE reported here represents an unusual type of kinesthetic imagery.
Keywords: body representation, cerebellum, kinesthetic imagery, motor imagery, out-of-body experiences,
somatosensory systems, temporal parietal junction
INTRODUCTION
The experience of one’s body is a central process to allow us
to interact with the outside world. Body experience is based on
the integration of visual, vestibular, and somatosensory infor-
mation (Giummarra et al., 2008; Berlucchi and Aglioti, 2010; de
Vignemont, 2011; Blanke, 2012; Moseley et al., 2012). This infor-
mation allows the tracking of the body in space and in relation
with other objects and beings in our environment. Tracking of our
body in turn, guides our movements (Goodale et al., 2008). The
conscious experience of our body is generally congruent across
sensory modalities so that, what we see of our body is also what
we feel from somatosensory and vestibular sensations (Tsakiris,
2010). The sensations and percept associated with our body in
movement can also be elicited in our imagination albeit most
of the time in an attenuated form. Motor imagery corresponds
to the cognitive version of motor actions without actual motor
movements (Guillot et al., 2012; Moran et al., 2012). This motor
“imagery” encompass visual components when we imagine move-
ments as we would see them from our own perspective or from
a third-person perspective (imagine someone else moving – or
imagine ourselves moving but from a third-person perspective)
and proprioceptive and vestibular components often referred to
kinesthetic “imagery” (Guillot et al., 2009, p. 698). Motor imagery
is intertwined within the brain’s preparatory processes preceding
action and, up to a certain point, the brain’s processes subserving
actual movement (Guillot and Collet, 2005). The strongest support
for this view has come from functional imaging that demon-
strated strong but incomplete overlap between imagery, action
preparation, and action (Porro et al., 1996; Guillot et al., 2008,
2009; Szameitat et al., 2012a,b). These studies show that motor
imagery is dependent both on brain regions associated with the
performance of motor action but also on the somatosensory brain
regions associated with body perception. Voluntary and involun-
tary motor imagery is also present in amputated individuals with
an associated phantom limb often together with somatosensory
perception (Melzack, 1989, p. 657; Ramachandran and Hirstein,
1998, p. 493). Some amputees can also train themselves to expe-
rience an anatomically impossible movement with their phantom
limb suggesting the plasticity of sensorimotor systems (Moseley
and Brugger, 2009, p. 1069).
The multi-component nature of body representation is also
revealed in perceptual illusions such as the rubber hand illusion
(Botvinick and Cohen, 1998). In the rubber hand illusion, the
vision-based belief that the rubber hand is not part of the par-
ticipant’s body is countered by the simultaneous touching of the
rubber hand and the real hand and leads to a shift in the attri-
bution of the localization of sensory stimulation from the real
hand to the rubber hand (Hohwy and Paton, 2010). During the
process of establishing the illusion, from completely separate to
unity with the rubber hand, several intermediate illusory experi-
ences can take place (Valenzuela Moguillansky et al., 2013, p. 1001).
In one experiment using a moveable hand model, conditions could
be manipulated so that participants reported a dissociation of the
sense of ownership (impression that the fake hand is their own)
or the sense of agency (impression that participants controlled
the movements of the fake hand) (Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2012).
Mismatch between the observed position of the hand model and
the sensed position of the real hand reduced sense of ownership
but did not disrupt the impression of agency. Conversely, passive
movement reduced agency but left ownership intact (Kalckert and
Ehrsson, 2012). These observations suggest that agency and own-
ership may depend on different but overlapping brain networks
(Jackson et al., 2006, p. 703). Another experiment demonstrated
that concurrent limb and full-body orientation illusions elicited
by virtual reality visual displacement were undissociated and not
dependent on action (Olive and Berthoz, 2012, p. 1050).
During these illusions, the participants do not doubt that the
shifted body perception is illusory (Blanke and Metzinger, 2009).
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In contrast, shifted body perception of neurological origin (Blanke
and Mohr, 2005) or pharmacologically induced (Morgan et al.,
2011; Wilkins et al., 2011) can lead to ambiguous embodiment
whereas people report that the illusory body or body part is
more realistic or corresponds to a “double” of their body. In the
descriptions below, the “double” refers to the illusory body (or
parts thereof). There seems to be a general consensus in adopting
the classification proposed by Brugger to describe these illusions
(Brugger and Regard, 1997). Autoscopic hallucination is a visual
hallucination of the upper part of a double of the body. Heau-
toscopy is a visual and somesthetic hallucination. The double,
which appears as through a veil, can mirror the person’s move-
ments. Heautoscopy hallucination is also accompanied by a vague
feeling of detachment and depersonalization. The double is felt
vaguely as another self. Feeling of a presence is a mostly somes-
thetic hallucination that a double is present usually close by or even
touching but not seen. Feeling of a presence is also called sensed-
presence experience when the presence is identified as another
person (Cheyne and Girard, 2007, p. 1065). Out-of-body experi-
ence is a visual and somesthetic experience in which the double
is seen from a different perspective, often motionless. Because the
body in this experience is “seen” from a third-person perspective
(i.e., from above), the body seen is illusory even if it is congruent
with the body’s position during the illusion (e.g., lying down). The
experience is accompanied by a profound feeling of being outside
of the body and with feelings of meaningfulness of the experience.
Three studies of self-reported anomalous body experiences in
unremarkable normal people (Braithwaite et al., 2011, p. 876;
Braithwaite et al., 2011, p. 1063; Braithwaite et al., 2013, p. 1064).
In the first one, it was noted that most instances of spontaneous
anomalous body experiences occurred during a relaxed or bor-
derline sleeping state and one-third reported (seeing) their body
from a different perspective while the rest reported a visual or
somatosensory shift in perspective. The participants who reported
out-of-body experience also self-reported more perceptual anom-
alies (Braithwaite et al., 2011, p. 876). In two subsequent exper-
iments, participants self-reporting anomalous body experiences
(mostly of visual nature) were more likely to respond strongly to
aversive visual patterns suggesting that the visual system of the par-
ticipants are somehow different, at least functionally (Braithwaite
et al., 2013, p. 1064; Braithwaite et al., 2013, p. 1063). The authors
also derived the hypothesis that these anomalous body experiences
depended on temporal lobe anomalies as measured by perceptual
tasks and questionnaires (Braithwaite et al., 2011, p. 876).
There also have been imaging enquiries into the brain areas
involved in body representation illusions in neurologically intact
participants (Blanke, 2012). Brain imaging studies have suggested
that activity in sensory integration areas such as the intrapari-
etal sulcus and the ventral premotor cortex are associated with
the establishment of the rubber hand illusion (Ehrsson et al.,
2004, 2005, 2007; Tsakiris et al., 2007). One experiment has used
repeated transcranial magnetic stimulation to gain information
on the brain areas involved in the rubber hand illusion (Tsakiris
et al., 2008). They found that, when the activity of the tempo-
ral parietal junction (TPJ) was perturbed by repeated transcra-
nial magnetic stimulation, the processing of body representation
mental imagery was impaired. However, in another transcranial
magnetic stimulation study, mental rotation of letter stimuli was
not affected suggesting a specific effect for body representation
(Blanke et al., 2005). Another experiment showed that, the tem-
poral parietal junction, which is involved in self processing and
multisensory integration of body-related information; and the
extrastriate body area (EBA), which responds selectively to human
bodies and body parts mental imagery is performed with mentally
embodied (EBA) or disembodied (TPJ) self location (Arzy et al.,
2006). The more intense hallucinations or illusions are usually
associated with brain lesions, abnormal brain function such as
epilepsy, major psychiatric syndromes, dissociative drugs such as
ketamine, or in micro-gravity conditions (Kornilova, 1997).
The study of the lesioned or abnormal brain areas is often used
to gain insight into the brain areas involved in normal body repre-
sentation phenomena. However, there is also anecdotal evidence
that these intense hallucinations can occur in non-neurological
cases but they have a low occurrence and, apart from micro-gravity
illusions, are unpredictable. In the present report, we used func-
tional MRI to examine an otherwise “normal,” healthy individual
that reported the ability to, at will, vividly experience her body
moving outside her physical body while lying down at rest. The
subjective description of the participant led us to use the term
extra-corporeal experience (ECE) throughout this manuscript to
underline the difference between the phenomenon studied here
and the more common definition of out-of-body experiences. We
included a number of guided imagery tasks to specify the ECE-
related brain activity. One control task was motor imagery for
a different movement (jumping jacks). A second control condi-
tion was alternating between actual finger movements and motor
imagery of the same movement. Finally, we were interested in
determining if there was a difference between imagining her-
self performing the ECE (but not experiencing the ECE) differed
from the imagining of another person performing the same ECE
movement.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANT
The participant was a right-handed woman, age 24, who was a
psychology graduate student at the time of testing. She signed an
informed consent approved by the University of Ottawa Research
Ethics Board. The participant was in an undergraduate class that
presented data on body representation hallucinations in patients
that report experiences of their body outside their physical body
(Blanke and Arzy, 2005). The participant spontaneously reported
after class that she could have a similar “out of body” experience.
She appeared surprised that not everyone could experience this.
The participant described her experience as one she began per-
forming as a child when bored with “sleep time” at preschool.
She discovered she could elicit the experience of moving above
her body and used this as a distraction during the time kids were
asked to nap. She continued to perform this experience as she grew
up assuming, as mentioned, that “everyone could do it.” This was
often done before sleep onset as an aid to enter sleep. She described
the experience as variable depending on her frame of mind. She
was able to see herself rotating in the air above her body, lying flat,
and rolling along with the horizontal plane. She reported some-
times watching herself move from above but remained aware of
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her unmoving “real” body. The participant reported no particular
emotions linked to the experience. As an adult, the participant
only infrequently “practiced” the experience; the experience does
not occur spontaneously but is induced wilfully. The participant
describes the experience in the following terms:“I feel myself mov-
ing, or, more accurately, can make myself feel as if I am moving.
I know perfectly well that I am not actually moving. There is
no duality of body and mind when this happens, not really. In
fact, I am hyper-sensitive to my body at that point, because I am
concentrating so hard on the sensation of moving. I am the one
moving – me – my body. For example, if I ‘spin’ for long enough,
I get dizzy. I do not see myself above my body. Rather, my whole
body has moved up. I feel it as being above where I know it actu-
ally is. I usually also picture myself as moving up in my mind’s
eye, but the mind is not substantive. It does not move unless the
body does.”
PROCEDURE
Four questionnaires were administered. The Pittsburgh Sleep
Quality Index (Buysse et al., 1989) was used to detect possible sleep
disturbances because sleep onset disturbances have been associ-
ated with altered somatosensory or vestibular perceptions (Braith-
waite et al., 2011). In order to estimate visual and kinesthetic
imagery, the participant was asked to complete the 8-item Move-
ment Imagery Questionnaire-Revised (MIQ-R; Hall and Martin,
1997) and the 20-item Kinesthetic and Visual Imagery Question-
naire (KVIQ; Malouin et al., 2007). Finally, the PAS perceptual
aberration scale (Arzy et al., 2007) was administered.
DATA ACQUISITION
The experimenter provided instructions to the participant
through MRI earphones. The data was collected in one imag-
ing session during which time both anatomical and functional
MR images were obtained. All imaging was performed using a
1.5-T Siemens Magnetom Symphony MRI scanner. The partici-
pant lay supine with her head secured in a custom head holder.
A conventional T1-weighted spin echo localizer was acquired and
used to prescribe a subsequent 3D FLASH (TR/TE 11.2/21 ms, flip
angle 60°, field of view (FOV) 26 cm× 26 cm, 256× 256 matrix,
slice thickness 1.5 mm) volume acquisition used for further struc-
tural analyses. A T2 FLAIR scan was also performed and inspected
by a neuroradiologist following the scanning session to ensure
that there was no structural anomaly. Whole brain fMRI was per-
formed using a T2*-weighted echo planar pulse sequence (TR/TE
3000/40 ms, flip angle 90°, FOV 24 cm× 24 cm, 64× 64 matrix,
slice thickness 5 mm, 27 axial slices, bandwidth 62.5 kHz).
Table 1 presents the order and characteristics of each run. The
participant was asked after the structural images were acquired if
she believed she would be able to “perform” her ECE: she reported
being certain she could. Functional imaging runs lasted 59 min in
total with an additional 10 min consisting of instructions between
runs. Six functional “runs” in the scanner using a block design
took place. Runs 1, 4, and 6 involved the participant going in and
out of her ECE experience for 5 min at the researcher’s oral com-
mand of “start”and“stop.”She induced the ECE to the researcher’s
command of “start” and then was stopped after 90 s with the word
“stop.” This was repeated four times for Runs 1 and 6 and three
Table 1 | Characteristics of each run during the scanning session.
Run
number
Blocks Number
of scans
(TR=3 s)
Block
durations
1 Extra-corporeal
experience 1 vs. rest
200 ECE 90, 87, 96, 108 s
Alternating rests of 60 s
between each ECE block
2 Visualizing ECE in
someone else vs. self
103 30 s Alternating blocks
3 Jumping jacks vs. rest:
kinesthetic imaging
103 30 s Alternating blocks
4 Extra-corporeal
experience 2 vs. rest
200 ECE 90, 87, 96, 108 s
Alternating rests of 60 s
between each ECE block
5 Actual finger movement
vs. visualization
103 30 s Alternating blocks
6 Extra-corporeal
experience 3 vs. rest
200 ECE 66, 60, 87 s
Alternating rests of 60 s
between each ECE block
times for Run 4. The participant was asked to perform her ECE
at the “start” prompt and to tap her finger when she felt herself
starting. Prior to imaging she had practiced this tapping at home to
ensure it would not interfere with her performance. She was asked
to tap her finger again if the ECE stopped before the researcher said
“stop.”As this was the case on two trials the blocks were adjusted to
maximize the data obtained and the image analysis included scans
from the ECE blocks and the rest blocks. If she concluded her ECE
prior to the experimenter stopping her she would again tap her
finger (in sight of the researchers). In Run 1, the ECE consisted
of being above her body and rocking from side-to-side. The par-
ticipant reported having trouble stopping the rocking movement.
The participant also signaled if the movement stopped during the
run – the time the movement stopped and re-started was recorded
for subsequent analysis. In Run 4, the participant was asked to
perform an ECE (above her body and spinning horizontally) and
to tap her finger when she felt herself starting. The participant
reported difficulty starting the movement (the onset of each sub-
run was always delayed contrary to other runs – all timings delays
were accounted for in the data analysis). The participant reported
that the spinning movement was hard to stop for the rest period.
Because the participant in general does not like the spinning move-
ment (she gets dizzy), she switched to a “bobbing on the ocean”
movement during Run 4 and informed the experimenter after the
end of that run. In Run 6, the ECE was the bobbing movement:
the participant reported the sub runs as being less “sharp.”
The second, third, and fifth runs were guided motor imagery.
Run 2 included an experimenter instructing with one word (either
“someone” or “you”) every 30 s, alternating while she visualized
(but not experienced) herself actually moving as she did in the ECE
or while she visualized someone else doing the same movement.
This was a 5-min task. The informal comment from the participant
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was that she did not “feel herself moving” when “visualizing” her
experience during run 2. We were interested in determining if
there was a difference between imagining herself performing the
ECE (but not experiencing the ECE) differed from the imaging
of another person performing the same ECE movement. Run 3
included the same alternating block design whereby the partici-
pant imagined herself performing jumping jacks or resting : this was
a control task to determine which structures were involved in non-
ECE motor imagery. The participant practiced the instructions for
Run 3 prior to starting the run to ensure that she was able to visu-
alize herself. From the participant’s comments, it was inferred that
visualizing herself doing jumping jacks did not involve the move-
ment sensations associated with her extra corporeal experience.
Run 5 involved the participant moving her right hand fingers (one
at a time) to her thumb at a frequency of 2 Hz and then visualizing
herself perform the same movement. Again, the participant did
not report a sensation of movement. This control task was added
to determine the brain areas involved in a simple motor action
and its imagined version. Again, each block was 30 s and the Run
was 5 min. Our conversations with the participant suggested that
her extra corporeal experience involved the sensation of move-
ment while other imagery tasks she performed did not involve this
sensation.
IMAGE POST-PROCESSING
The functional images were reconstructed and whole brain images
were realigned to correct for motion by employing the proce-
dure of Friston et al. (1995), using Statistical Parametric Mapping
(SPM8) software. The motion correction did not exceed 1 mm.
Images were spatially normalized to match the echo planar imag-
ing (EPI) template provided in SPM8 with 2 mm× 2 mm× 2 mm
voxel sizes. Images were then smoothed with a 10 mm full-width
at half-maximum Gaussian filter.
STATISTICAL ANALYSES
A fixed effects analysis was performed with data from each Run
separately. The blocks of ECE were compared with the rest blocks
from the same Run. The Runs with motor imagery and/or visu-
alizations were analyzed by contrasting the two types of blocks,
for example in Run 3 scans from the rest blocks were subtracted
from the visualization of jumping jack blocks (Jumping Jacks
minus Rest).
RESULTS
QUESTIONNAIRES
The MIQ-R results indicated that the participant had kinesthetic
imagery comparable to that observed in competitive sport ath-
letes (M = 5.5) but higher visual imagery (M = 7) (Roberts et al.,
2008). In the KVIQ, the participant scored an average of 4.1 on the
visual imagery scale (comparable to healthy but older controls)
and 4.3 on the kinesthetic imagery scale, which is higher than
the same controls. The Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index (PSQI= 5)
was slightly higher than would be expected in healthy partici-
pants (PSQI= 2.67): this was essentially due to longer sleep latency
(90 min). In the PAS perceptual aberration scale, the participant
responded“false”to most statements except for the following items
(her answers in italics): (T.12) Now and then, when I look in the
mirror, my face seems quite different than usual. (Only when con-
templating my own mortality); (T.15) Sometimes when I look at
things like tables and chairs, they seem strange. (Occasionally but
voluntary. Sometimes late at night, I can play with perspective i.e.,
make things appear closer/farther away. Also, sometimes, ordinary
objects seem bizarre in the sense that all existence is bizarre); (T.23)
It has seemed at times as if my body was melting into my sur-
roundings. (Always voluntary. I can make it feel like my body is
going down into my bed); (T.31) Sometimes I feel like everything
around me is tilting. (Almost always this is voluntary . . . usually
when I am bored in class).
ECE RESULTS
The participant reported being successful at beginning and ending
her ECE on demand of the experimenter. The experience for Run
1 began immediately and she began to see herself above her body
rocking with her feet moving down and up as her head moved
up and down as in bobbing in ocean waves. The second ECE Run
was the most intense and involved the participant watching herself
above her own body, spinning along the horizontal axis. The final
ECE involved the participant spinning as in the second ECE.
Neural activation patterns for each of these ECE Runs were
analyzed separately with rest subtracted from the experience.
Given the lack of significant difference between the results of
each of the three Runs, all ECE Runs were combined into one
analysis to increase power and observe brain regions that were
concomitantly activated for each Run. Results are reported with
a family wise error (FWE) very stringent correction for multi-
ple comparisons at 0.001. Results are presented in Figure 1. The
most significantly and consistently activated areas during the ECE
compared to the non-ECE blocks were left lateralized in the sup-
plementary motor area (SMA) (x, y, z =−2, −18, 62, cluster
247, T = 6.66, p= 0.001), supramarginal gyrus/posterior supe-
rior temporal gyrus (x, y, z =−64, −46, 24, cluster 60, T = 6.04,
p= 0.001), inferior temporal gyrus (x, y, z =−48,−54,−20, clus-
ter 72, T = 5.89, p= 0.001), middle and superior orbital frontal
gyri (x, y, z,=−26, 56,−10,T = 5.05, p= 0.001), and the cerebel-
lum (x, y, z =−50, −48, −30, T = 5.76, p= 0.001). The parietal
and superior temporal activation taken together correspond to the
temporal parietal junction. There was significantly less activation
during the ECE blocks compared to non-ECE blocks (Figure 2)
in bilateral posterior visual regions: the lingual gyrus (x, y, z = 14,
−64, 4, cluster 19205, T = 13.23, p= 0.001) and the cuneus (x, y,
z = 0,−92, 18, cluster 19205, T = 12.71, p= 0.001).
VISUALIZATION RESULTS
During imagining herself moving as she did in the first ECE (Run
1), without inducing an ECE, controlling for multiple compar-
isons at a p< 0.001, the participant activated more left cerebellum
(x, y, z =−46, −48, −44, cluster 406, T = 5.66, p= 0.001) and
bilateral lingual gyrus (x, y, z =−14,−62, 6, cluster 980,T = 5.00,
p= 0.001; x, y, z = 6,−58, 8, cluster 790,T = 4.82, p= 0.001) than
when imagining someone else moving in the same way (Figure 3).
Similarly, she showed significantly less activity during self-
imagining than imagining someone else in the bilateral superior
orbital frontal gyrus (x, y, z =−18, 66,−2, cluster 148, T = 4.40,
p= 0.025; x, y, z = 14, 68,−2, cluster 146, T = 4.38, p= 0.026).
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FIGURE 1 | Rendered image of significantly activated regions of the
brain while the participant was having extra-corporeal experiences.
Most significantly activated regions are lateralized to the left side and
include the supplementary motor area (F), the cerebellum (B,D,E), the
supramarginal gyrus (D,F), the inferior temporal gyrus (B,D,F), the middle
and superior orbitofrontal gyri (A,C,D,E). The p-value was set at 0.001
uncorrected for this image with the cluster threshold at 200 significant
voxels.
FIGURE 2 | Areas of reduced activity during the ECEs compared to rest.
The visual cortex is particularly impacted. (A) Representation of the right
side; (B) activity on the left. The p-value for this image was set at 0.05 FWE
corrected.
The second control task involved the participant imagining her-
self performing jumping jacks and then not imagining anything
and just keeping her eyes closed waiting for the next start cue for
the jumping jacks. Results are presented in Figure 4. The imagining
of herself performing the jumping jacks, controlling for multiple
comparisons at p< 0.001, revealed significantly more activity in
the posterior SMA (x, y, z =−2, −10, 60, cluster 1424, T = 7.95,
p= 0.001), paracentral lobule (x, y, z = 0, −12, 68, cluster 1424,
T = 6.72, p= 0.001), middle temporal gyrus (BA22) (x, y, z = 68,
−48,8, cluster 132,T = 5.72,p= 0.04),precentral gyrus (BA44) (x,
y, z =−60, 6, 22, cluster 136,T = 5.11,p= 0.035), inferior parietal
lobule (x, y, z =−40, −64, 58, cluster 265, T = 4.64, p= 0.001),
and superior temporal gyrus (BA22) (x, y, z = 68,−34, 12, cluster
156,T = 4.78, p= 0.019). The TPJ activity was more bilateral than
during the ECE runs (Figure 4). There was also less activity in bilat-
eral cuneus (x,y, z = 6,−76, 4, cluster 22067,T = 10.16,p= 0.001)
and bilateral superior orbital frontal gyrus (x, y, z =−28, 26,−28,
cluster 617, T = 6.50, p= 0.001; x, y, z = 4, 48, −28, cluster 455,
T = 5.69, p= 0.001) during the jumping jack imagery compared
to rest.
Another contrast of interest was the actual movement of the fin-
gers to the thumb compared with imagining the same movement
(Figure 5). There was significantly more activation during the
imagining vs. the actual movement in several areas that were simi-
larly (but not identically) activated during the ECE. These included
the bilateral inferior frontal triangularis (x, y, z = 50, 40, −14,
cluster 326, T = 5.27, p= 0.001; x, y, z =−42, 58, 0, cluster 1132,
T = 5.18, p= 0.001), left middle temporal gyrus (x, y, z =−62,
−58, −2, cluster 371, T = 6.31, p= 0.001), left cerebellum (x, y,
z =−22, −88, −46, cluster 270, T = 5.97, p= 0.002), left supe-
rior parietal lobule (x, y, z =−36, −60, 50, cluster 581, T = 5.56,
p= 0.001), and a more anterior part of the SMA (bilateral) (x,
y, z = 0, 14, 58, cluster 711, T = 5.56, p= 0.001). Finally, there
was significantly less activity during imagining than movement
(Figure 6) in the left postcentral and precentral gyri (x, y, z =−32,
−30, 70, cluster 1756,T = 12.85, p= 0.001; x, y, z =−36,−30, 62,
cluster 1756, T = 12.05, p= 0.001, respectively), and right cere-
bellum (x, y, z = 10, −56, −22, cluster 997, T = 9.95, p= 0.001),
areas similar to those activated during the jumping jack condition.
DISCUSSION
The present experiment examined functional brain imaging pat-
terns in a participant that reported being able, at will, to produce
somatosensory sensations that are experienced as her body moving
outside the boundaries of her physical body while remaining aware
of her unmoving physical body. It is interesting that the develop-
ment of the participant’s ability was associated with delayed sleep
onset in childhood (which persisted in adulthood) because the
occurrence of out-of-body experiences has been frequently asso-
ciated with hypnagogic phenomena (Cheyne et al., 1999; Terhune,
2009). The reported experience is similar to what is defined by
Brugger as an out-of-body experience but without the feeling of
being only outside of her body and without any of the emotional
content typically reported in out-of-body experiences (Brugger
and Regard, 1997). The subjective description of the participant
led us to use the term ECE throughout this manuscript to under-
line the difference between the phenomenon studied here and
the more common definition of out-of-body experiences. Also,
because the ECE was private to the participant, we have to rely on
the participant’s descriptions to interpret the results. With these
caveats in mind, we find that the brain functional changes associ-
ated with the reported ECE were different than those observed in
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FIGURE 3 | Results from visualizing herself doing the same action she performed in the first ECE vs. visualizing another person performing the same
movement. (A) Bilateral lingual gyrus differences in activity and (B) the left cerebellar differences. The p-value for this image was set at 0.001 uncorrected.
FIGURE 4 | Results from visualizing herself performing jumping jacks compared to rest. (A) Right hemisphere; (B) dorsal view of the SMA activity; and
(C) left hemisphere activation. The p-value for this image was set to 0.001 uncorrected with the cluster threshold at 100 significant voxels.
motor imagery. The results suggest that the ECE reported here
represents an unusual type of kinesthetic imagery that shares
some features of previously described out-of-body experiences
and some features of more typical motor imagery.
The ECE was reported as a mixture of visual imagery and kines-
thetic imagery but the kinesthetic component was prominent as
evidenced by the report of feeling dizzy when performing a rota-
tional movement. The prominence of kinesthetic experience over
the visual experience is consistent with a strong bilateral deacti-
vation of the lingual gyrus and cuneus encompassing the primary
visual cortex. Activations are mainly left-sided and involve the left
SMA, supramarginal and posterior superior temporal gyri (the last
two overlap with the temporal parietal junction, which has been
associated with out-of-body experiences). The cerebellum also
shows strong activation that is consistent with the participant’s
report of the impression of movement during the ECE. There
are also left middle and superior orbital frontal gyri activations,
structures often associated with action monitoring.
The TPJ activation that was observed during the ECE is
consistent with patient cases that report autoscopy and out-of-
body experiences when the functional integrity of that area is
altered (Blanke et al., 2004; Blanke and Mohr, 2005; Blanke,
2012). Studies of experimentally induced altered body imagery
have demonstrated that transcranial magnetic stimulation of the
TPJ area can interfere with the ability of healthy individuals to
imagine themselves in body orientations similar to out-of-body
experiences (Blanke et al., 2005). Electrical stimulation of the TPJ
in epileptic patients also produces various sensations associated
with out-of-body experience (Blanke et al., 2002). Interestingly,
several of the active clusters found in the present experiment dur-
ing the ECE (left supramarginal gyrus, left inferior temporal gyrus,
left cerebellum) correspond closely to clusters with mirror prop-
erties associated with action observation and execution that were
identified by a recent meta-analysis (Molenberghs et al., 2012).
The middle orbital frontal gyrus is a highly multimodal area
that has been associated with performance monitoring and pro-
vides flexibility in response to selection based on ongoing feedback
(Elliott et al., 2000). The cluster that we observed in the left orbital
frontal gyrus corresponds to cluster 6 of the K-6 solution described
by (Kahnt et al., 2012) in their parcelation of the orbitofrontal cor-
tex (Kahnt et al., 2012). They reported functional connectivity with
adjacent regions in the lateral prefrontal cortex as well as regions
in the inferior parietal cortex and the lateral inferior temporal cor-
tex; the latter two structures correspond to activations we observed
during the ECE.
We also instructed the participant to alternate between visu-
alizing herself performing her ECE and visualizing someone else
performing the same movement with the specific instruction that
she should not experience the ECE but only “see” it. The goal was
to guide the participant toward taking a first-person perspective of
her own experience and transposing it to a third-person perspec-
tive. The first-person perspective was associated with a bilateral
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org February 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 70 | 6
Smith and Messier Voluntary out-of-body experience
increase in the lingual gyrus and another one in the left cerebellum:
this may indicate that imagining herself included both a visual
component and possibly a kinesthetic component (even following
FIGURE 5 |There was significantly more activation during the
visualization of finger movement compared to the actual movement.
Each letter represents a different view of the brain (A) anterior view, (B)
posterior view, (C) right lateral view, (D) left lateral view, (E) ventral view,
and (F) dorsal view. The p-value for this image was set to 0.001 uncorrected
with the cluster threshold at 100 significant voxels.
a specific instruction to avoid this) that was absent when visu-
alizing using the third-person view. The self-visualization was
accompanied by a reduction in orbitofrontal activation that may
indicate that visualizing herself was easier than taking the third-
person view and required less monitoring of activity. Jackson
et al. (2006) studied activations in participants observing hand
or foot movements seen either from a first-person perspective or
a third-person perspective. They found significantly more activity
in the left sensory-motor cortex for first-person, during observa-
tion alone, and in the lingual gyrus for third-person perspective
suggesting that perspective taking is associated with a different
pattern of activation (Jackson et al., 2006). It is difficult to recon-
cile the higher lingual cortex activity observed with our participant
taking the first-person view and the higher activity with the third-
person perspective in Jackson et al. (2006). However, in that study,
participants were only shown pictures corresponding to first- or
third-person view of static limbs whereas our participant was
instructed to visualize a whole body movement. A similar pro-
cedure contrasting first and third-person view was used in a study
in which participants viewed hand movements from the two per-
spectives (Lorey et al., 2009) and in a study where participants were
instructed to imagine using a tool presented to them on a picture
or imagine someone else using the same tool (Ruby and Decety,
2001). Both these studies reported activation differences when
contrasting first- and third-person views. Our results obtained
comparing first- and third-person perspective for the ECE experi-
ence is similar in that activation differences were observed between
the two conditions when the participant “only imagined” the ECE.
The pattern of differences that we observed was unsurprisingly
quite different than in previous studies likely owing to the task
differences and the number of participants (Ruby and Decety,
2001; Lorey et al., 2009).
In the third condition, we examined the brain areas involved in
a whole body motor imagery to examine if the ECE was similar to
motor imagery in this participant. The first general observation is
that in this condition, activations tended to be bilateral as opposed
to mainly left-sided activations observed in the ECE. The second
observation is that the activations when the participant was told
FIGURE 6 | Motor areas significantly activated more during
movement of her fingers to thumb compared with visualizing the
same movement. (A) Representation of the left primary motor cortex;
(B) representation of the right cerebellum. The p-value for this image
was set to 0.001 uncorrected with the cluster threshold at 100 significant
voxels.
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to imagine doing jumping jacks were less extensive than for the
ECE. They included bilateral SMA extending into the paracentral
lobule, bilateral inferior parietal lobule, right middle and superior
temporal gyri, and left precentral gyrus. There was reduced activity
in the cuneus bilaterally and in the superior orbital frontal gyrus
also bilaterally. Activations of the SMA, inferior parietal lobule,
and precentral gyrus have been reported in two previous studies
of kinesthetic imagery using hand movements (Guillot et al., 2009;
Szameitat et al., 2012b). ECE and whole body motor imagery were
both associated with a reduction in cuneus activation (but less
so for motor imagery) suggesting that visual imagery was inhib-
ited during both conditions. During motor imagery, there was less
activity in the superior orbital frontal cortex whereas there was
more activity in the middle and superior orbital frontal cortex
during ECE. This is suggestive of more motor monitoring during
ECE than motor imagery.
The last condition was an attempt to compare the activations
associated with actual hand movements to imagining the same
movement in this participant (Guillot et al., 2009; Szameitat et al.,
2012b). In one of these studies, there were 13 participants selected
on the basis of excellent motor imagery (Guillot et al., 2009)
whereas the other included 21 unselected participants (Szameitat
et al., 2012b). The number of participants in both these stud-
ies achieved a greater statistical power and reported many more
activations than in the present single-case study. The finger move-
ments used in the Guillot et al. study was a learned and practiced
sequence, more complex than the one we used, which could be
considered more of an automatic nature. The movement used in
the Szameitat et al. study consisted of a simple wrist movement
timed with a tone. Although it is not clear how comparable these
studies are with the present observations, there are a number of
concordant findings. First, real and imagined movements produce
activations in the SMA. The activations reported by Szameitat et al.
(2012a,b) in the contrast imagery-rest include premotor areas in
the precentral gyrus, superior frontal gyrus, and bilateral infe-
rior frontal gyri that were also observed in the “jumping jacks”
condition of our participant.
It has been shown that visual imagery is reliant on the occipital
lobe and the superior parietal lobule, as well as lateral premotor
cortex, while kinesthetic imagery is more associated with motor
areas and inferior parietal activity (Guillot et al., 2009, p. 698). The
ECE in the present study activated the left side of several areas asso-
ciated with kinesthetic imagery and was associated with a strong
deactivation of the visual cortex. This suggests that her experi-
ence really was a novel one, with a strong kinesthetic component.
This was a healthy young woman with no brain abnormalities,
thus providing a window into the brain during non-pathological,
self-elicited ECE.
There are a number of limitations to the present study. The
first obvious one is that we relied on the participant’s report of
her experience. Given that the participant spontaneously reported
her experience assuming that it was a common occurrence and
the detailed (and unusual) description of how she developed this
ability, we are inclined to take her report at face value. The private
nature of imagery is common to most research in imagery (includ-
ing other imagery conditions in the present report) although a
number of control measures have been devised but they were not
used here. One example of such measures is the increase in heart
rate and pulmonary ventilation during imagined actions (Decety
et al., 1993; Wuyam et al., 1995). The description of the imagery
tasks could have been more clearly specified including the “jump-
ing jacks” condition and the third-person ECE task (Moran et al.,
2012). Statistical power was obviously limited in this single-case
study, which means that potentially several activations escaped
detection. Limited statistical power could also have prevented
us from finding activation differences when the participant per-
formed “variations” of her ECE experience (spinning vs. “bobbing
on the ocean”).
This is the first study with a non-pathological participant who is
able to elicit an ECE upon demand. Clearly, replication is required
to ascertain if this pattern of activation is similar in other people
who can have self-initiated ECE. The existence of such a case and
its presentation raises the possibility that this phenomenon may
have a significant incidence but unreported because people do not
think this is exceptional. Alternatively, the ability might be present
in infancy but is lost without regular practice. This would be rem-
iniscent of the discovery and eventual study of synesthesia that
some researchers now hypothesized is more prevalent in young
people or can be developed (Deroy and Spence, 2013; Simner,
2013).
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